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FOREWORD
Since Brown v. Board of Education' was decided in 1954, social science research findings have continued to play a role in school desegregation litigation.
The legal issue in Brown seemed simple: whether segregated schooling solely
on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws requiring-or at least permitting
2
-such segregation, denies minority children the equal protection of the laws
even though the segregated public schools are equal in terms of physical
facilities, resources, and other tangible factors. 3 But efforts to implement the
decision and to extend it to school segregation in the North have revealed not a
single issue, but many diverse and complex underlying issues.' As the legal
issues have become more complex, sociologists, psychologists, economists, demographers, educators, and other social scientists have been making more
fr equent court appearances as expert witnesses, often introducing ambiguous
and contradictory research findings, making it difficult to apply such evidence
to the resolution of these issues.
At some point in the early 1960s, school desegregation began to be defended or justified by scholars and others on a very narrow basis-that deseg1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. "No state shall ... deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONs,. amend. XIV, §1.

3.

347 U.S. at 492-93.

4. Some illustrative examples of tie kinds of issues wxhich the courts Conlfro0 today are the
following: whether the actions of school offt tals that resultin segregation in jurisdictions where,
unlike the South, there were no state laws rC(Liring segregated schooling, are iinviolation of the
foteit

enth

amendment;

xwhether

the

actions

of othe

governmental

agetonics

that

result

in

segregation-such as the adoption of exCILtsit nar' zoning policies and the Iocation and Contstlt tction of public housing projects in certain areas and not illothers--is a violation: whether segregation tescLhling solely ft'om residential patterns imposes an affirmative dIty upon school officials to
redress the racial imbalance; whether busing to overcome racial imbalance is a valtd constitutional
tool and, ifso, what are the limits to the use of that remedy: whether the usual eqtuitable remedial
powers offthe district court are limited by the extent of the violation. even if stLchI limits mean a pro
forma decree which will have no effect on the segregated schooling of the inner cities; wNhether
school officials, once the system has been clesegregated, are responsible for the racial imbalance
that occurs 1hirucigh natural shifts in residential patterns; wxhether minorities who,given a truily free
choice between a segregated, commurnity controlled school and integiated schools, max' contiStttionall' choose the former; whet her the ust of otherwise edutationalls valid ltols-stch as ibilit
grotiping, tracking, special classes for the handicapped-are consi it itinally' permissible if the
effect is segregated classrooms even though the school building is integrated.
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regation would improve the achievement test scores of black students. The
argument is as follows: minority segregated schools are inherently inferior
(little was said about the harm to whites of attending segregated schools) 5 and

as a result, minority children were being held back both educationally and
economically.
If blacks were given an "equal educational opportunity"-i.e., by assigning black students to a desegregated school-the achievement gap between
white and black students would be eliminated as would, ultimately, the gap
in educational and economic attainment between white and black adults.
This "myth"-that equal educational opportunity would resolve all the
social and economic ills of the nation, 6 as well as bring about racial justicecollided sharply with the social science research of the late 1960's and early
1970's, and disillusionment set in.
The Coleman Report,7 published in 1966, indicated that the major factor
affecting pupil performance was the home environment, and that differences
in school resources explained very little of the differences in pupil performance. In the early 1970's, the writings of such academics as Arthur Jensen
and Richard Herrnstein on the effect of race or class, environment, and IQ on
educational outcomes 8 were widely disseminated. They concluded from their
analysis of the data that the gap in IQ between blacks and whites explained
most of the gap in achievement scores, and that environment played only a
small role. Finally, Christopher Jencks' book on the effects of family and
schooling, 9 which argued that schooling has little effect on a student's life
chances, further undermined confidence that racial justice could be secured
through desegregation of the schools. The simplistic faith that merely reassigning bodies to different schools would bring about equality was shattered,
with a profoundly unsettling effect not only on education, but on the law.
There are a number of questions about the relationships between social
science and the judicial response to school segregation for which there are now
no ready answers. What are the legal issues confronting courts today, and
which of these issues rely in part on, or can be illumined by, social science
research? On which issues is there agreement among social scientists-and on
which, disagreement-as to the research findings and the conclusions to be
5.

See Hearings on Equality of Educational Opportunity Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal

Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. la, at 73 (1970); Hart v. Community School
Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
6. The preamble of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Act of Apr. 11,
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, and the Presidential message accompanying the bill when it
was introduced, 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1448-50 (1965), clearly reflect this belief.
7. J. COLEMAN, EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
8. See Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement, 39 HARV. ED. REV. 1
(Winter 1969); R. HERRNSTEIN, I.Q. IN THE MERITOCRACY (1973).
9.
C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN
AMERICA (1972-
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drawn from those findings? What further research is needed before valid conclusions can be drawn? And broader, more normative questions can also be
asked: what role should social science play in school desegregation litigation and
is the adversary process the appropriate way of dealing with controversial social
science issues? Since few judges or lawyers are familiar with the language and
methodology of social science, a real possibility exists that substantial misinterpretation and overstatement will accompany the increasing use of social
science evidence in the courts. Overgeneralizations-both in the courtroom and
in the current debate over desegregation among academics and among the
public at large-have been made on the basis of data from small, local studies,
perhaps unique as to the circumstances in that particular community; many of
these studies were also based on data collected only during the first transitional
year of desegregation. It is particularly important that attorneys understand
the nature of social science evidence and its limitations, as upon them falls the
duty of making it understandable to the courts. To quote Judge J. Skelly
Wright in a case involving economists as expert witnesses on behalf of both of
the parties in the litigation: 10
[L]awyers .

.

. [have] a basic responsibility .

.

. to put the hard core statistical

demonstrations into language which serious and concerned laymen could, with
effort, understand.
Given the significance of the subject, it seemed especially appropriate, during the twentieth anniversary of the Brown decision, to bring together a
number of the nation's leading social scientists and lawyers who are currently
engaged in school desegregation litigation or in research on various aspects of
school desegregation to explore questions such as these. Consequently, in August 1974, a Conference was convened in South Carolina, its objective being
10. The full quotation from Judge Wright's opinion in Hobson v. Hansen, reads as follows:
[T]he unfortunate if inevitable tendency has been to lose sight of the disadvantaged
young students on whose behalf this suit was first brought in an overgrown garden of
numbers and charts and jargon like "standard deviation of the variable," statistical "significance," and "Pearson product moment correlations." The reports by the experts-one
noted economist plus assistants for each side-are less helpful than they might have been
for the simple reason that they do not begin from a common data base, disagree bver
crucial statistical assumptions, and reach different conclusions. Having hired their respective experts, the lawyers in this case had a basic responsibility, which they have not completely met, to put the hard core statistical demonstrations into language which serious
and concerned laymen could, with effort, understand. Moreover, the studies by both
experts are tainted by a vice well known in the statistical trade-data shopping and scanning to reach a preconceived result; and the court has had to reject parts of both reports
as unreliable because biased. Lest like a latter day version of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce this
litigation itself should consume the capital of the children in whose behalf it was brought,
the court has been forced back to its own common sense approach to a problem which,
though admittedly complex, has certainly been made more obscure than was necessary.
The conclusion I reach is based upon burden of proof, and upon straightforward moral
and constitutional arithmetic.
Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 859 (D.D.C. 1971).
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the clarification of how social science research has been used-and possibly
m isused-in school desegregation litigation.
The Conference attempted to identify (1) what existing social science research tells us about the conditions, if any, that maximize the probability that
various objectives of school desegregation can be obtained; (2) what are the
current social, psychological, and educational consequences of school desegregation; and (3) which directions might future litigation and research on school
desegregation take. The debate over the effects of desegregation and the use of
busing as a tool to implement the command of Brown has tended to obscure the
fact that there is substantial agreement on certain aspects regarding the educational effect of desegregation. The objective of the Conference was to highlight
this agreement as well as to explore the areas of disagreement and uncertainty,
and the nature-both substantive and methodological-of the research needed
to respond to questions for which at present there are no adequate empirical
answers.
While few of Lis are without our preferences with respect to the desirability
of desegregation, the Conference was not intended to advocate or support any
particular course of action or set of policies. Nor was the Conference to be
another forum in which to debate Brown and footnote eleven, or even to debate
whether segregation is harmful per se. Rather, given the Supreme Court's
command that school districts desegregate now'' and the increasing involvement of lower courts in drawing school desegregation plans, the focus was on
determining the most effective wax to make school desegregation work, what
social science tells us in this regard, and when is it appropriate-or inappropriate-for courts to intervene in what may appear to be educational policy.
The Conference participants, listed on page 427, were selected after asking
dozens of scholars and policy makers to identify the outstanding social scientists
and lawyers dealing with issues related to school desegregation. Naturally, not
everyone agreed on every name, but the degree of consensus that emerged was
remarkable. \orking sessions were devoted to the following topics: Effects of
School Desegregation on Achievement and Life Chances, Effects of School
Desegregation on Personality and Attitudes, Factors in Securing School Desegregation, Integration W\ithin the School and the Classroom, Interdistrict Remedlies After Milliken v. Bradley, and The Relevance of Social Science Research in
Preparing School Desegregation Plans. Each session began with prepared presentations that had been solicited in advance, and was followed by intense and
extensive discussion periods.
This symposium issue is the product of that Conference. In order to put the
symposium's articles in context, Frank T. Read has traced the judicial evolution
of the law of school desegregation from Brown to Milliken. Professor Read's
11. See Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd.. 396 U.S. 290 (1970); Alexander v. Holmes
CounIy Bd. of E uc
(..
396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. (ounty School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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article is followed by an article by Betsy Levin and Philip Moise that attempts to
set out the legal issues with which courts are concerned today in dealing with
school desegregation cases and the extent to which social science has been
brought to bear on the resolution of these issues.
In addition to articles from lawyers and social scientists, "comments" were
solicited from several of the federal judges who frequently have before them
seemingly intractable school desegregation cases. J. Braxton Craven, United
States Circuit Judge on the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and author
of that court's opinion in Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 2 and James
B. McMillan, United States District Judge for the District Court of the Western
District of North Carolina and author of the opinion in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education,' 3 have joined John Minor Wisdom, United
States Circuit Judge on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in presenting their views regarding the role that social science plays in the judicial
decision-making process. Judge Wisdom's article was originally presented as
the keynote address marking the opening of the Conference and it sets the
tone for what is to follow.
The relationship of residential segregation-and the use of a neighborhood
schools policy-to school segregation is analyzed by Reynolds Farley, followed
by Owen M. Fiss's exploration of the most explosive issue in school desegregation today-the use of busing to counteract the results of residential segregation, and the degree to which its social costs ought to be weighed against the
constitutional injury it purports to remedy.
Social scientists frequently assert that "facts" must be separated from "value
judgments," implying that social science is objective, "scientific" truth. Henry
M. Levin argues that this is not true, the problem being that the researcher
himself, and certainly those outside the discipline-lawyers and judges
particularly-fail to see the bias inherent in his selection of what to study, the
way in which he develops his hypotheses, and in his analysis of the data and
inclusion or exclusion of various factors. Others, such as Elizabeth G. Cohen,
reiterate this view.
Several articles attempt to answer the questions raised at the Conference
about the extent to which existing social science research can identify the social,
psychological, and educational consequences of desegregation. Meyer Weinberg reviews the impact of desegregation on achievement, Elizabeth Cohen on
racial attitudes, and Edgar G. Epps on aspirations, self-concepts, and other
aspects of personality.
Gary Orfield's article distinguishes between desegregation that comes from
merely reassigning students to different schools and effective integration. He
suggests that the latter is a much longer process than the courts, the federal
12. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Cowl. 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
13. 311 F. Supp. 265 (WV.D.N.C.), iev'd in pait, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), distrit court opinion
reinstated, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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government, and social scientists have seemed to assume, and that its success
depends on the presence of certain factors within the schools, such as the
attitudes and abilities of principals and the adaptation of the curriculum to
meet the needs of the changing student body. He suggests that, used creatively,
the process of desegregation can lead to significant educational reforms that
will have a positive effect on all children.
In view of the increasing political barriers to complete integration, and the
fact that many blacks-particularly those in the inner cities in the North-are
still waiting for Brown's promise of equal educational opportunity to be fulfilled, Derrick A. Bell explores some alternatives to integration that he suggests
can also bring about equal educational opportunity.
It is important to note that it is not only the extent to which social science
has become intertwined with the legal issues of school desegregation that needs
to be reassessed, but also the extent to which the courts-especially the federal
district courts-are involved in school desegregation and even educational policy issues. Mark G. Yudof provides this reassessment of the role of courts in the
context of suspension and expulsion decisions. Other such areas in which
courts have become involved are tracking and ability grouping policies,1 4
whether or not to "mainstream" mentally handicapped children, 5 and the
provision of bilingual educational programs as part of the relief in school
desegregation cases affecting Hispano-Americans. 16
In the concluding article, Willis D. Hawley and Ray C. Rist outline the
conditions that seem to affect the probability that various goals of desegregation might be attained. In the process, they highlight some of the significant
questions to which further social science research should be addressed.
While the Conference and preparation of the articles for this symposium
issue of Law and Contemporary Problems were supported by a grant from the

Ford Foundation, none of the views expressed herein is necessarily endorsed
by the Foundation.
The editors hope that the earnest effort to communicate within and across
disciplines has resulted in a symposium that will be of interest not only to
scholars of diverse disciplines but will also be a useful resource for the practitioners-the judges, attorneys, educators, legislators and other policy
makers-who are currently struggling with the difficult issues involved in
school desegregation.
BETSY LEVIN

WILLIS D.

HAWLEY

14. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aYjld sub noai.Smuck v.
Hansen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. (ir.1969).
15. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Edcw., 388 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
16. See, e.g.,
Serna v.Potales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1973) a j'd, 499
F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).

